Abstract. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payo¤ at every future stage.
Introduction
There are many ways to formulate the notion of Nash equilibrium in undiscounted stochastic games. The strongest of these is uniform e-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a uniform e-equilibrium if for any n su‰ciently large, no player could increase his expected average payo¤ in the first n periods by more than e by deviating. A payo¤ vector is a uniform equilibrium payo¤ if it is the limit (as e goes to 0) of the payo¤s that correspond to a sequence of uniform eequilibrium strategy profiles. Arguments in favor of this formulation of Nash equilibria can be found in Aumann and Maschler (1995) .
Existence of uniform equilibrium payo¤s in multi-player undiscounted stochastic games while suspected is still not proven. Progress on this question has been slow and hard won. A major step was made by Mertens and Neyman (1981) who proved that every two-player zero-sum stochastic game admits a uniform value. Subsequently Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) proved the existence of a uniform equilibrium payo¤ in two-player non zero-sum absorbing games. A decade and a half after the paper by Mertens and Neyman, Vieille (2000a,b) proved the existence of a uniform equilibrium payo¤ in two-player non zerosum stochastic games. The argument is arduous and extending it to more than two players appears di‰cult. Some progress in this direction is described in Solan (1999) where existence of uniform equilibrium payo¤s is established for three-player absorbing games, and in Solan and Vieille (2001b) where existence of uniform equilibrium payo¤s is established for a class of multi-player quitting games.
While Nash equilibrium is the most popular solution concept for a game it is not the only one. For games in strategic form, Aumann (1974) proposes the notion of correlated equilibria, which are probability distributions over the space of strategy profiles, such that if a strategy profile is chosen according to this distribution, no player can profit by not following the strategy chosen for him.
For finite games in strategic form, correlated equilibria have a number of appealing properties. They are computationally tractable. Existence is verified by checking a system of linear inequalities rather than a fixed point. The set of correlated equilibria is closed and convex. Aumann (1987) argues that it is the solution concept consistent with the Bayesian perspective on decision making. Nor does one need to assume that the correlation device is a deux et machina in the game. In Foster and Vohra (1998) it is argued that players can use the history of past plays as a correlation device. Finally, our colleague Roger Myerson has been quoted as saying:
'If there is intelligent life on other planets, in a majority of them, they would have discovered correlated equilibrium before Nash equilibrium. ' An equivalent formulation of correlated equilibria for games in strategic form is to consider an extended game that includes a correlation device. The device chooses a signal for each player before start of play, and reveals to each player the signal chosen for him. The game then proceeds as before, but each player may base his choice of strategy on the signal he received. In this formulation, a uniform correlated e-equilibrium is a uniform e-equilibrium in an extended game. A uniform correlated equilibrium payo¤ is a limit, as e goes to 0, of the payo¤s that correspond to a sequence of uniform correlated eequilibria. It is this form of correlated equilibrium that is the focus of the paper.
An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, the game terminates with positive probability, and the players receive some terminal payo¤ at every future stage. We show that every absorbing game admits a uniform correlated equilibrium payo¤. 1 The proof uses the ideas in Solan (1999) . First an auxiliary game is defined with non-absorbing payo¤s that di¤er from those in the original game. Then we consider the limit of discounted stationary equilibria in this auxiliary game. The asymptotic properties of this sequence suggest the form that a uniform correlated equilibrium must take.
Another generalization of correlated equilibrium for sequential games involves a correlation device that sends to each player a signal before the start of each round. The signals can depend on the history of past signals but not on past play. This way the correlation device is independent of the play. In contrast with the problem of existence of uniform equilibrium payo¤s, existence of a uniform correlated equilibrium of this kind was proved for every multiplayer stochastic game with finitely many states and actions by Solan and Vieille (2001a) .
Another related result is Nowak (1994) , which studies multi-player stochastic games with measurable state space, compact action spaces and the average payo¤ criterion, that satisfy the assumption of uniform geometric ergodicity. Nowak proves in this model the existence of stationary correlated equilibrium with public signalling; that is, at every stage all players observe a public signal, which is drawn at every stage according to the same distribution.
There are two additional aspects in the paper that may interest the reader. First, the approach that we take in solving the problem is a development of the approach introduced in Solan (1999) , of studying the asymptotic behavior of a sequence of discounted equilibrium in a modified game. Solan (1999) defined the daily payo¤ of each player in the auxiliary game as the minimum between his original daily payo¤ and his min-max level. This definition is not su‰cient for our purposes, and we have to see what are the necessary properties needed for the approach to work. Thus, the proof here illuminates the properties of the modified payo¤ function that are required for this approach.
Second, some of the results we prove here can be used in the study of equilibria in multi-player stochastic games (see the results in section 9.2).
We start in section 2 with some examples that illustrate the main ideas the proof relies on. We then provide the model and the main result in section 3. In section 4 we present some preliminary results; we study how players can use their actions to transmit information, and we claim that in every absorbing game there exists a mixed action profile that satisfies one of a set of desirable properties. In the following four sections we prove that if those desirable properties hold, the game admits a correlated equilibrium payo¤. The proof of the claim appears in section 9.
Examples and main ideas
We provide a series of examples that illustrate the main ideas of the proof.
A quitting game is a sequential game where each player has two actions: to quit (Q) or to continue (C ). The game continues as long as all players decide to continue. The moment any player decides to quit, the game terminates. The terminal payo¤ depends on the subset of players that quit at the terminating stage. If the game continues forever, the payo¤ to the players is some fixed payo¤ vector. Quitting games are a special case of absorbing games.
Example 1
Consider first, the following three-player quitting game that was studied by Flesch et al. (1997) . In this game player 1 chooses a row, player 2 a column, and player 3 a matrix. Every absorbing entry, which corresponds to at least one player quitting, is denoted with an asterisk. Flesch et al. prove that the following profile is a uniform equilibrium.
. At stage 3n þ 1, the players play
. At stage 3n þ 2, the players play C;
. At stage 3n þ 3, the players play C; C;
Here n ¼ 0; 1; . . . : The corresponding uniform equilibrium payo¤ is ð1; 2; 1Þ. In a quitting game each pure strategy can be associated with an element t A N W fyg that specifies the first period in which the player quits. If t ¼ y, it means that the player never quits. A profile of pure strategies would be a tuple ða 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 Þ where a j is the period in which player j quits.
The uniform equilibrium that Flesch et al. identify corresponds to a probability distribution p ¼ p ð1Þ n p ð2Þ n p ð3Þ over the space of pure strategy profiles given by
Note that neither this distribution nor the uniform equilibrium payo¤ are symmetric. In fact, Flesch et al. prove that the game possesses no symmetric uniform equilibrium payo¤, even though the payo¤ matrix is symmetric.
The probability distribution p that is defined by pð1; y; yÞ ¼ pðy; 1; yÞ ¼ pðy; y; 1Þ ¼ 1=3 ð1Þ
is a uniform correlated equilibrium with payo¤ ð4=3; 4=3; 4=3Þ ¼ 1 3 ð1; 3; 0Þ þ 1 3 ð0; 1; 3Þ þ 1 3 ð3; 0; 1Þ:
Our interpretation of the equilibrium is that a correlation device chooses one of the players uniformly at random (the chosen one) and is told to quit in the first stage. The other two players are told never to quit. Suppose player 1 is informed that he was chosen. Notice that if player 1 alone disobeys the instructions by never quitting his payo¤ will be 0. If player 1 quits at some later stage, this does not increase his payo¤.
Consider now a player not chosen, say, player 3. He does not know the identity of the chosen one; its as likely to be player 1 as it is player 2. So, if he follows his instructions to play C, his expected payo¤ will be 1.5. On the other hand, if player 3 quits in the first round, his expected payo¤ will be 1/2. He cannot know whether he can profit by deviating and quitting at the first stage, and therefore he should not deviate.
The construction described above is sensitive to two things. The first is the incentives that the chosen player has to not quitting at stage 1. The second is the payo¤ to an unchosen player from two players quitting at the same stage. If this were large enough, in our example above, player 3 would want to quit at the first stage.
The second of these can be accomodated by masking the stage at which the chosen player quits. For example, the chosen player is told to quit in each stage with probability e > 0. Now player 3 is ignorant of who the first player is to quit as well as the stage at which they will quit. In fact with high probability any stage that player 3 chooses to quit in, he will be the only player to be quitting. The joint probability distribution p consistent with this formulation is: pðn; y; yÞ ¼ pðy; n; yÞ ¼ pðy; y;
Dissuading the chosen player from quitting at a stage other than that prescribed by the device, or continuing indefinitely, is more di‰cult. The next example shows that this is a real possibility.
Example 2
Consider a slight modification of Example 1, where only the non-absorbing payo¤s are changed. The correlated equilibrium proposed for the first example does not apply here. Players 1 and 2 get higher payo¤s in the non-absorbing entry. Thus, if player 1 is the chosen one, why should he quit? The other two players don't know that he is the chosen one. To deal with this possibility we will ensure that one of the unchosen players can punish player 1 for his deviation. The idea is to instruct the unchosen players to play C for a certain number of rounds and then play Q. To force compliance by player 1, the payo¤ to player 1 by continuing forever should be at most 1.
In this example each player i has a single punisher -a player j 0 i that by quitting yields player i a low payo¤. Player 1 is the punisher of player 3, player 2 is the punisher of player 1 and player 3 is the punisher of 2. A simple modification of the previous equilibrium scheme suggests itself: the device chooses a player uniformly at random to quit at the first stage, and informs his punisher that he should quit at the second stage if the chosen one has not quit at the first stage.
The flaws are obvious. First, the punisher knows who the chosen one is, and might profit by quitting on the first period too. This problem does not arise in this example. Second, the player who is neither the chosen one nor the punisher receives some information too. If player 3 is neither the chosen one nor the punisher, he can deduce that player 1 is the chosen one. Therefore player 3 would rather quit at the first stage.
To avoid these flaws the device must inform the punisher while masking the identity of the chosen one. One way of doing this is described below.
Define the following joint probability distribution over the space of pure strategy profiles. A player i is chosen with the uniform distribution. W.l.o.g. assume that player 1 is the chosen one. Denote by ðn 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 Þ a pure strategy profile. Since player 1 is the chosen one, n 1 is uniformly distributed in f1; . . . ; Mg, where M > 1=e 2 . Player 2 is the punisher of 1, so n 2 is uniformly distributed in fM þ 1; . . . ; 2Mg. Finally, n 3 ¼ n 2 þ 1.
Let us verify that with high probability no player can profit by not quitting at the stage recommended by the device.
The chosen player knows that he was chosen, since his quitting stage is at most M, whereas the quitting stages of the other two exceed M. If the chosen player does not quit, he will be punished and get 0. Moreover, the probability he will correctly guess the quitting stage of his punisher is low. Hence he has no reason to disobey the recommendation. With high probability the punisher and the third player received a signal in fM þ 1; . . . ; 2Mg. In this case, the conditional probability that each is a punisher is 1/2, so they have no reason to deviate also. Thus, this joint probability distribution is a uniform correlated e-equilibrium, provided e is su‰ciently small.
Example 3
Absorbing games can be viewed as quitting games where the players have more than one 'quitting' action and more than one 'continue action'. Thus a player may be able to punish two di¤erent players with di¤erent 'quitting' actions. For example, player i punishes player j 1 with a quitting action Q 1 and he punishes player j 2 with a quitting action Q 2 . If the correlation device instructs him to use Q 1 instead of Q 2 , he is in a position to infer the identity of the chosen one. This problem is solved by assuming that the game is generic, i.e. the payo¤s in all the entries are di¤erent. We then consider only punishing actions which maximize the payo¤ of the punisher amongst his quitting actions. When a player has two continue actions then, by playing one or the other continue actions in various stages, he can send public signals to the other players. This feature can be used to construct a correlated equilibrium di¤er-ent from the one constructed before. This is illustrated in our next example.
We modify example 2 by adding one more action, C 2 , for player 1. Any correlated equilibrium payo¤ of Example 2 is also a correlated equilibrium payo¤ here. We use this example to illustrate the use of public signalling in constructing correlated equilibria.
To describe the correlated equilibrium profiles it will be convenient to use a correlation device that sends signals to the players in an arbitrary signal space. It is easily verified that the signal space that we use is equivalent to the space of strategy profiles.
Since there are only 3 players, the construction below could be simplified, but we present the construction for an arbitrary number of players.
The correlation device does the following.
1. The device chooses a player i uniformly at random. This player is informed that he should quit in the first M stages, where M A N is su‰ciently large. 2. The device chooses a verification key v, uniformly from the set f1; . . . ; Mg. The players play as follows in the first M stages.
6. Each player j 0 i continues in all M stages. 7. Player i chooses at random a stage t A f1; 2; . . . ; Mg. He continues in all stages but t, and quits at stage t.
If no player quit in the first M stages, the identity of i is revealed. One possible way for player 1 to publicly announce an integer v A f1; . . . ; Mg requires M 2 stages and is described below. Players 2 and 3 play C in all the M 2 stages. Player 1 plays C 2 in one of the stages ðv À 1ÞM; . . . ; vM À 1, and C in all other M 2 À 1 stages. If player 1 chooses the stage in which he plays C 2 at random, and if M is su‰ciently large, no player can profit too much by deviating. If M is su‰-ciently large, the chance that player 1 can correctly guess v when he is the chosen one is arbitrarily small.
Call v 0 the actual message sent by player 1. If v 0 0 v, player 1 is declared the deviator, and is punished. If v 0 ¼ v, with high probability player 1 is not the chosen one. The play then proceeds as follows.
9. If i 0 1 player 1 publicly announces k. Now all players except player 1 can calculate the identity of the chosen one. Note that when there are only three players, once player 1 has correctly announced v, player j 0 i; 1 can deduce the identity of the chosen one.
Now that the identity of the chosen one was revealed, he should be punished by his punisher.
10. In one of the next M stages, the punisher j i , provided j i 0 1, quits, and punishes player i.
11. If after M stages no one has punished the chosen one, player 1 deduces that he is the punisher, so he quits in one of the subsequent M stages.
The model and the main result
In this section we introduce notation and state the main result. . I is a non-empty finite set of players.
. A i is a non-empty finite set of actions available for player i. Let A ¼ U i A I A i .
. r i : A ! R for i A I . For every a A A, r i ðaÞ is the daily (non-absorbing) payo¤ for player i.
. w : A ! ½0; 1. For every a A A, wðaÞ is the probability the game is absorbed if the action combination a is played by the players.
. u i : A ! R for i A I . Given the game was absorbed by action combination a A A, u i ðaÞ is the constant payo¤ player i receives at every future stage.
The game is played as follows. At every stage n A N each player i A I chooses, independently of his opponents, an action a i n A A i . The action combination a n ¼ ða i n Þ i A I determines a daily payo¤ rða n Þ and a probability of absorption wða n Þ. With probability 1 À wða n Þ the game continues to the next stage, and with probability wða n Þ the game is absorbed, and the players receive the absorbing payo¤ uða n Þ at every future stage. We assume standard monitoring and perfect recall, so at every stage all the moves played upto that stage are known to all players.
For every finite set K, DðKÞ is the set of all probability distributions over K. For every m A DðKÞ and every k A K, m½k is the probability of k under m.
We identify each k A K with the probability distribution in DðKÞ that gives weight 1 to k.
is identified with the probability distribution in X i that gives weight 1 to a i . Let H n ¼ A n be the space of all histories of length n, and H ¼ 6 nb0 H n be the space of all finite histories.
A (behavioral) strategy for player i is a function
A profile is a vector of strategies, one for each player. A stationary strategy can be identified with an element x i A X i , and a stationary profile with a vector
The mixed extension of w to X is still denoted by w. A mixed action profile x A X will be called absorbing if wðxÞ > 0 and non-absorbing otherwise. For every x A X , every a A A and every i A I , x i ½a i is the per-stage probability to play a i according to x i , and x½a ¼ Q i A I x i ½a i is the per-stage probability that action combination a is played under x.
A strategy s i of player i is pure if s i ðhÞ A A i for every finite history h A H. A profile s ¼ ðs i Þ is pure if each s i is pure. Let S i denote the space of pure strategies of player i, and S ¼ U i A I S i the space of pure strategy profiles. We endow S i with the s-algebra generated by finite cylinders: for every n and every vector of actionsã i a i ¼ ða
S is endowed with the product s-algebra.
Every profile s induces a probability measure over the space of infinite plays. We denote by E s the corresponding expectation operator. In particular, every profile s defines an expected payo¤ during the first n stages:
where y denotes the absorption stage.
Definition 3.2. Let e > 0. A payo¤ vector g A R jI j is a (uniform) correlated eequilibrium payo¤ if there exists a positive integer n 0 A N and a probability measure p e over S such that for every player i A I and every measurable function f :
The probability measure p e is a (uniform) correlated e-equilibrium.
A payo¤ vector g A R jI j is a (uniform) correlated equilibrium payo¤ if it is the limit, as e goes to 0, of correlated e-equilibrium payo¤s.
The payo¤ vector g A R jI j is a (uniform) equilibrium payo¤ if it is a correlated equilibrium payo¤, and for every e > 0 the probability measure p e is a product measure p e ¼ 1 i A I p i e , where each p i e is a probability measure over S i .
Intuitively, a probability measure p e over S is a correlated e-equilibrium if there is only a small probability under p e that given the pure strategy chosen for him, a player can profit a lot by disobeying the recommendation.
The main result of the paper is:
Theorem 3.3. Every multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium payo¤.
We assume w.l.o.g. that 0 a r; u a 1, and that every player has at least two actions: jA i j b 2 for every i A I . Since payo¤s are bounded, if for every e > 0 there exists a correlated e-equilibrium then a correlated equilibrium payo¤ exists. Moreover, if p is a correlated e-equilibrium for some absorbing game, it is a correlated 3e-equilibrium for any game where the payo¤s di¤er by at most e. In particular, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the function u is generic; that is, for every player i A I and every two action combinations a; b A A, u i ðaÞ 0 u i ðbÞ. As every three player absorbing game admits an equilibrium payo¤, we assume throughout the paper that jI j > 3 (we will only use the fact that jI j b 3).
Correlation devices
It will be more convenient to consider an equivalent formulation of correlated equilibria using correlation devices. Given a correlation device we define an extended game GðDÞ as follows. A signal s ¼ ðs i Þ i A I A S is chosen according to p (which is common knowledge). Each player i is informed of s i . The game now proceeds as the original game, but each player can use his private signal to choose an action at every stage.
In this formulation, g is a correlated e-equilibrium payo¤ of G if and only if there is a probability distribution p over S such that g is an e-equilibrium payo¤ of GðDÞ, where D ¼ ðS; pÞ. This formulation is more general than the one we presented above, but it is more convenient to work with. In our construction, the signal space S is (equivalent to) the space of pure strategy profiles S.
The information available to each player i at stage n is an element of S i Â H nÀ1 . Thus, a strategy for player i in the extended game is a function
All previous definitions (e.g. profiles, induced payo¤ ) can be analogously defined for the extended game.
Preliminaries

On exits and individual rationality
Definition 4.1. The real number v i A R is the (uniform) min-max value of player i if for every e > 0 there exists a positive integer n 0 A N such that for every profile s
Ài there exists a strategy s i of player i that satisfies:
and there is a profile s Ài e of I nfig such that for every strategy s i of player i,
The profile s Ài e is an e-min-max punishment profile against player i.
Thus, players I nfig can reduce the payo¤ of i to v i , but they cannot reduce it any more.
Existence of the min-max value was proved by Mertens and Neyman (1981) for two-player stochastic games, and by Neyman (2002) for multiplayer stochastic games. Moreover, Neyman (2002) proves that the min-max value is the limit, as the discount factor goes to zero, of the discounted minmax values.
Remark: In our construction, a deviator is punished with the min-max value and not the max-min value. There are two reasons for that. First, we would like to reduce the amount of correlation needed by the players. Second, results that are proven here might be useful in the study of equilibrium payo¤s in multi-player stochastic games.
The multi-linear extension of r to X is still denoted by r. Define an extension of u to X by
whenever wðxÞ > 0, and u i ðxÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. Note that wðxÞu i ðxÞ is multi-linear, but u i is not multi-linear; it is the expected absorbing payo¤ if the players play the mixed action x (given absorption occurs with positive probability). 
Usually, deviations can be followed by punishment with the min-max level, hence one gets a stronger definition of individual rationality (see Solan (1999) ). In our context players may not know the identity of the deviator, hence the deviator may deviate several times without being detected.
In absorbing games it is sometimes the case that absorption requires coordinated action on the part of a group of two or more players. For every non-absorbing mixed action x A X we will be interested in the minimal subsets of players who can force the game to be absorbed with positive probability. In other words sets fig, a singleton, denote the exit simply by a i , and call it a unilateral exit of player i. If jLj b 2 the exit is a joint exit. Denote by EðxÞ the set of all exits w.r.t. x.
Signalling
Since players do not have an explicit signalling device, they rely on their strategy choices to signal information. To construct an equilibrium where players will signal to each other one must ensure that no player has the incentive to deviate during a signalling phase. 
We claim that if i is a signaller w.r.t. x then for every finite message set M and every e > 0 there exists a vector of strategies of player i, s i ¼ ðs Thus, the players can associate with each message a unique set of nonabsorbing histories. If the realized history at stage n 0 is h A H n 0 , and if P m is the unique element in P that contains h, all players understand that message m was sent. The first condition is needed to make deviations during the signalling phase non-profitable. The second condition ensures that with high probability m was the message the signaller intended to transmit. The third condition ensures that if all players follow the signalling mechanism, absorption does not occur during the signalling phase.
To prove the claim, fix an e > 0. Choose n 1 > 1=e 2 and n 0 ¼ jMjn 1 
and e also determine the number of periods n 0 required to transmit a message.
From now on, whenever we specify in a profile that a signaller i sends a message m, we mean that player i plays for n 0 stages the strategy s i m , and any other player j 0 i plays the mixed action x j . It will be clear from the context which mixed action profile x is to be used.
During the signalling period, players who are not signallers may deviate in two ways. Either they can alter the frequency with which they play actions in suppðx i Þ, or they can play actions outside suppðx i Þ. The second type of deviation is detected immediately and can be punished with the min-max value. If x is individually rational for the expected payo¤ of the players conditioned on the message sent, this type of deviation can be deterred. The first type of deviation does not change the message that is sent, since P depends only on the actions of the signaller.
We conclude this section with a definition of weak-signallers: 
Classification of non-absorbing profiles
Here we divide non-absorbing stationary profiles into four groups, according to the way information can be transmitted.
2 Lotteries made at each stage are independent of the outcome of previous lotteries. 3 In Example 3 we used a di¤erent mechanism for signalling: Player 1 had an action a 1 B suppðx 1 Þ such that wðx À1 ; a 1 Þ ¼ 0, and he played that action at most once during some pre-specified time interval to transmit information. Since we do not know how to replicate this construction if (i) in Definition 4.4 is satisfied, we chose the present construction. Definition 4.6. A non-absorbing profile x is isolated if it admits no signallers. It is semi-isolated if it admits exactly one signaller, but no weak signallers. It is weak if it admits exactly one signaller and at least one weak signaller.
No appellation is assigned to non-absorbing profiles that admit at least two signallers. We refer to isolated profiles also as isolated actions, to emphasize that they are pure action combinations. If x is semi-isolated, and if player i is the unique signaller it admits, we say that i is the signaller at x.
For example, consider the following two-player absorbing games where each player has 2 actions, and only the absorbing structure is given (an asterisked entry means that the probability of absorption is positive, and a nonasterisked entry means that the probability of absorption is 0):
In game 1, ðT; LÞ is an isolated profile. In game 2, any convex combination of ðT; LÞ and ðT; RÞ is semi-isolated. In game 3, ðT; LÞ and ðB; RÞ are weak, as is any convex combination of ðT; LÞ and ðT; RÞ which gives positive probability to ðT; LÞ, and any convex combination of ðT; RÞ and ðB; RÞ which gives positive probability to ðB; RÞ. The profile ðT; RÞ admits two signallers.
It is easy to see that the support of any isolated action is disjoint from the support of any semi-isolated or weak profile, and that the support of any semiisolated profile is disjoint from the support of any weak profile.
If x and y are semi-isolated, then either suppðxÞ and suppðyÞ are disjoint, or they have the same signaller, and any convex combination bx þ ð1 À bÞy is also semi-isolated. In particular, there are disjoint sets B 1 ; . . . ; B K that form the maximal supports of semi-isolated profiles: the support of any semi-isolated profile is contained in some B k , and for each k there is some semi-isolated profile whose support is B k . We call each set B k a maximal semi-isolated set. In game 2, K ¼ 1 and B 1 ¼ fðT; LÞ; ðT; RÞg.
If x is non-absorbing and EðxÞ contains a joint exit, then x admits at least two signallers. If x is isolated, semi-isolated or weak, EðxÞ includes only unilateral exits.
The punishment level
In this section we define the punishment level of player i at a mixed action profile x. Roughly speaking, this is the lowest payo¤ players I nfig can inflict on player i when everyone is supposed to follow mainly x.
For every non absorbing profile x, denote
By convention, the maximum over an empty set is Ày. This is the best absorbing payo¤ player i can get if players I nfig play In our construction, on the equilibrium path, if a player uses a unilateral exit, he uses an exit that maximizes his absorbing payo¤. In particular, if x is isolated, or semi-isolated with signaller j, the only unilateral exit player j may use is b j ðxÞ. The definition of p i j ðxÞ captures the idea that if x is isolated, or semi-isolated with signaller j, then player j does not know the identity of the deviator, hence only the action b j ðxÞ can be used for punishment. If x is semiisolated with signaller not j, then our mechanism will reveal the identity of the deviator to j, hence j can choose the action that punishes the deviator the most.
Define the punishment level (by absorption) of player i at x by
This definition captures the idea that one can choose (through an appropriate definition of a correlation device) the player who punishes the deviator the most. Player i is punishable at x if p i ðxÞ a g i ðxÞ. In this case, let j i ðxÞ be the punisher of player i at x; that is, a player j that attains the minimum in the right hand side of (4). Observe that since there are at least three players, and since each player has at least two actions, p i ðxÞ is always finite (for isolated or semi-isolated x).
The next Lemma claims that for every maximal semi-isolated set B k and every i A I , the function p i : DðB k Þ ! ½0; 1 is quasi-concave.
Lemma 4.7. Let B k be a maximal semi-isolated set, and let i be the signaller at B k . Then the function p i : DðB k Þ ! ½0; 1 is quasi-concave.
Proof: Since the minimum of quasi-concave functions is quasi-concave, it is su‰cient to prove that for every j 0 i and every d j B suppðx j Þ, the function f : DðB k Þ ! ½0; 1 defined by f ðxÞ ¼ u i ðx Àj ; d j Þ is quasi-concave. Since the ratio of two linear functions is quasi-concave, the result follows. 
Proof: Fix a player i A I . Let B 0 H A be the set of all isolated actions, and B Kþ1 H A be the set of all non absorbing action profiles that are neither isolated nor contained in any maximal semi-isolated set. For every k ¼ 0; 1; . . .
Observe that the sets B 
Observe that (6) agrees with (5) for every mixed action profile x such that suppðxÞ J 6
Kþ1 k¼0 B k , and that for every k and every fixed x Ài A DðB Ài k Þ, the functionr r i ðx Ài ; x i Þ is concave in x i . We now extendr r i to X. For every x A X and every k ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; K þ 1, let p k : X ! DðB 0 k Þ be the projection function:
The projection is defined arbitrarily if x½B Observe that at most one term in this summation is non zero. The extended functionr r i is a sum of finitely many continuous functions, hence continuous, and it clearly agrees with (5) on 6
A classification result
For every x A X and every probability distribution m A DðEðxÞÞ we define the expected absorbing payo¤ given by m to be
Recall that if EðxÞ contains joint exits then x admits two signallers.
Proposition 4.10. For every absorbing game there is a mixed action profile x A X and a probability distribution m A DðEðxÞÞ that satisfy one of the following conditions.
1. x is absorbing, x is individually rational for uðxÞ, and u i ðxÞ ¼ u i ðx Ài ; a i Þ for every player i and every action a i A suppðx i Þ such that wðx Ài ; a i Þ > 0. 2. x is non absorbing, and x is individually rational for rðxÞ. 3. x is non absorbing, suppðmÞ contains a single exit, which is unilateral, and x is individually rational for uðmÞ. d) (i) x is isolated, and (ii) for every player i A I, m½EðxÞ X A i > 0 implies that i is a punishable player at x. d 0 ) (i) x is semi-isolated with signaller i 0 , and (ii) for every player i 0 i 0 , m½EðxÞ X A i > 0 imply that i is a punishable player at x. d 00 ) x is either weak, or admits at least two signallers.
Since the proof of this Proposition is involved, it is deferred to Section 9. It is well known that if condition 1 (resp. 2, 3) holds, then uðxÞ (resp. rðxÞ, uðmÞ) is an equilibrium payo¤. Thus, given Proposition 4.10, to prove Theorem 3.3 it su‰ces to show that if 4 holds, the game admits a correlated equilibrium payo¤. Moreover, we will see that in this case, uðmÞ is a correlated equilibrium payo¤.
In the next section we sketch the construction of equilibrium payo¤s in the first three cases. In the following three sections we show how to construct a correlated equilibrium payo¤ if the three cases (4.d), (4.d 0 ), (4.d 00 ) that appear in condition 4 Proposition 4.10 hold.
Cases 1, 2 and 3
If either one of the first three cases of Proposition 4.10 hold, an equilibrium payo¤ exists. We will construct for each of the cases an e-equilibrium profile; namely, a correlated e-equilibrium with a trivial correlation device that sends no messages. The construction is known and standard, and the interested reader is referred to Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) , Solan (1999) Assume that the conditions of Case 2 are satisfied. The players play as in Case 1 the stationary profile x, and monitor their opponents for deviations. If the players follow the stationary profile x the expected payo¤ is rðxÞ. The two types of deviations mentioned for Case 1 apply here too, and they can be deterred as above.
Assume that the conditions of Case 3 are satisfied. Let a i be the unique unilateral exit in suppðmÞ. The players play the stationary profile ðx Ài ; ð1 À hÞx i þ ha i Þ, where h > 0 is su‰ciently small, while monitoring their opponents for deviations. If the players follow this profile the game will be eventually absorbed, and the expected average payo¤ is uðmÞ. Deviations are deterred as in the previous two cases. 4 
Case 4.d: Isolated actions
In this section we consider case 4.d of Proposition 4.10. Thus, we assume that x ¼ a is isolated. 
Define the following mechanism, where M A N is su‰ciently large. It is easy to check that if the players follow the strategy profile s ¼ ðs i Þ then the expected payo¤ is P i A I n½iuða Ài ; b i ðaÞÞ. We now verify that if M is su‰ciently large, no player can gain too much by deviating.
First, if M is su‰ciently large, the probability a player correctly guesses d (if he is not i) or d 0 (if he is i) is low. Since player i is punishable, he cannot profit to much by deviating.
Second, if M is su‰ciently large, then, with high probability, no player j 0 i knows whether he is the punisher or not. Therefore, if a player j 0 i plays some action b j 0 a j before stage d, js expected payo¤ is
In particular, no player j 0 i can gain too much by deviating. If w i ða Ài ; b i ðaÞÞ is strictly less than 1, even if the 'designated quitter' plays the action b i ðaÞ at stage d the game can continue. Once he plays b i ðaÞ, his identity is revealed to everyone. Since some players may get a low payo¤ if the game is actually terminated by the designated quitter, a new designated quitter must be chosen. As signals are sent only before start of play, this player needs to know in advance that, if the game is not terminated by the first quitter, he should do the job.
Thus, in this case the correlation device chooses an infinite sequence of quitters and punishers, which are chosen independently according to the procedure explained above, so that every player receives an infinite sequence of positive integers.
The players play in rounds; at round k, if the game was not already absorbed, the players play as explained above using the kth signal from the infinite sequence.
If some player i plays the action b i ðaÞ in one of the first M stages of the round, everyone treat him as if he was the designated quitter, and continue to the next round. Note that if i is not the kth designated quitter, only the kth designated quitter knows of i's deviation, but he has no way to transmit this information to the other players. 5 If no player i played the action b i ðaÞ in the first M stages of the round, the identity of the punisher j is revealed at the punishment stage. From that stage on, the punisher plays ð1 À hÞa j þ hb j ðaÞ, where h > 0 is su‰ciently small, while all other players play a Àj . The punisher punishes with small probability at every stage, to mask the punishment stage.
One can verify that if h is small compared to min i A N wða Ài ; b i ðaÞÞ > 0, this mechanism is a correlated e-equilibrium. 9
7. Case 4.d 0 : Semi-isolated profiles
In this section we consider case 4.d 0 of Proposition 4.10, and prove that uðmÞ is a correlated equilibrium payo¤.
Since x is semi-isolated, m is supported by unilateral exits. Let e > 0 be su‰ciently small, and let i 0 be the signaller at x.
We define the following mechanism, that is performed in rounds, and depends on the parameters h A ð0; 1Þ,
Coordination phase 1. The correlation device chooses for every t A N an element Y t A f0g W EðxÞ, where
2. For every t A N and every a i A EðxÞ, the device chooses an integer k t ða i Þ A f1; 2; . . . ; K 2 g according to the uniform distribution. 3. Each player i A I receives, for every t such that i t ¼ i, both Y t and k t ðY t Þ. 4. Each player i A I such that i 0 i t receives fk t ða j Þ; j 0 i; t A Ng. 5. For every t A N the device chooses a verification key v t A f1; 2; . . . ; K 2 g, and an encryption key e t A f1; 2; . . . ; jI jg according to the uniform distribution. 6. The signaller i 0 receives the sequence fe t ; t A Ng, and, for every t such that i t 0 i 0 , he receives v t as well. 7. Each player i 0 i 0 receives fv t ; t A Ng, and fe t þ i t mod jI j; t A Ng. 8. All choices of the device are done independently. If i t 0 0 then player i t has to use the exit Y t at the tth round. If i t ¼ 0, no player will use any unilateral exit.
The mechanism proceeds in rounds. Each round consists of two phases, a quitting phase, which lasts for K 2 stages, and a revelation phase. We now explain the structure of round t. , while players i 0 i t do know it, the chances that player i t can correctly guess k t ða i t Þ are small, provided K 2 is much large than K 1 . Deviation (i) can therefore be detected with high probability. For the same reason, deviation (iv) can be detected with high probability. Deviation (iii) can be detected once player i t plays Y t for the second time. Since x is individually rational for uðmÞ, these three types of deviations are not profitable, provided a deviator is punished by his min-max level upon deviation.
To deter deviation (ii), the identity of i t should be revealed, so that he can be punished. If no player used any unilateral exits in the first K 2 stages of round t, a revelation phase takes place.
Revelation B Punishment phase 11. The signaller i 0 publicly transmits v t and e t .
By transmitting v t , the signaller i 0 proves that he is not i t ; if K 2 is su‰ciently large than the chance that he can correctly guess v t is low. After the revelation phase, all players but player i 0 know the identity of i t (unless i 0 ¼ i t , in which case i 0 is also aware of that). If i 0 is the deviator, he can be punished at his min-max level. If i t 0 i 0 and the punisher of i t is j 0 i 0 , then player j has to punish i t .
12. If the punisher j of i t is not i 0 , for 1=h 2 stages,6 player j plays ð1 À hÞx j þ hd j , where d j A A j is the action that minimizes u i ðx Àj ; a j Þ among all actions a j such that wðx Àj ; a j Þ > 0 and h is su‰ciently small. In those stages, player i 0 plays x i 0 , and every player j 0 0 j; i 0 , plays
This ends the description of round t.
6 Whenever we refer to a non-integer number s of stages, it should be understood as the smallest integer larger than s.
Absorption need not occur during the last 1=e 2 stages of the round for three reasons: (i) Player i t was supposed to be punished, but by the luck of the draw, player j did not punish him. This event occurs with low probability, provided h is su‰ciently small. (ii) i t ¼ 0, and no player was supposed to be punished. (iii) Player i 0 is the punisher of player i t .
In the first two cases the players continue to the next round. However, if i 0 is the punisher of i t , then i 0 should play his punishing action. Recall that the punishing action of i 0 is b i 0 ðxÞ, so that, if all other players never use a unilateral exit, i 0 will eventually play b i 0 ðxÞ, thereby punishing i t , without knowing who i t is. Thus, if i 0 is the punisher of i t , in all subsequent rounds each player j 0 0 i 0 stops following the above procedure, and plays the mixed action x j 0 . The only complication that may arise is if i 0 is the punisher of i t , but m½b i 0 ðxÞ ¼ 0. Observe that if the players follow the above mechanism then absorption eventually occurs, and the expected payo¤ is uðmÞ. Thus, if for 1=h 2 subsequent rounds no player has used any exit in EðxÞ, player i 0 understands that he is the punisher, and plays at every subsequent stage the mixed action ð1 À hÞx i 0 þ hb i 0 ðxÞ.7 It is straightforward to verify that no player can profit too much by deviating, provided h is chosen su‰ciently small and K 1 and K 2 su‰ciently large.
Case 4.d 00 : Other non-absorbing profiles
In this section we deal with weak profiles and non-absorbing profiles that admit at least two signallers. In these cases the identity of the chosen one can be revealed to every player, so that he can be punished with his min-max level, rather than by single punishments. We will prove that uðmÞ is a correlated equilibrium payo¤.
x admits at least two signallers
In this section we assume that x admits at least two signallers. In particular, EðxÞ may contain joint exits. It is well known (see, e.g. Vieille (2000b) or Solan (1999) ) that joint exits can be controlled by the players. To control unilateral exits the device chooses whether any player should use a unilateral exit, and if so who it is. The signallers will then reveal the identity of the chosen player. Since there are at least two signallers, the identity is revealed to everyone, and if the chosen player does not use a unilateral exit, he can be punished. If one of the signallers misreports, the report of the other signaller is still consistent with the realized play. So such a deviation can be detected by the players.
Our construction here is similar to the one presented in Case 4.d 0 . We describe here only the relevant changes.
Let i 1 and i 2 be two distinct signallers. The coordination phase is similar to that presented in Case 4.d 0 , with the following exception. The device chooses a verification key and an encryption key independently for the two signallers at 
In the revelation phase both signallers execute step 11 as described in Case 4.d 0 .
If the players follow s ¼ ðs i Þ then the game will eventually be absorbed. Moreover, provided that d is su‰ciently small, there exists h A ð0; 1Þ such that the probability that the game is absorbed through the exit a L k k is approximately m½a L k k , thereby the expected payo¤ for the players is approximately uðmÞ.
There are several ways players may deviate from this procedure. (i) A player could play an action that has probability 0 under this procedure. Such a deviation is detected immediately, and can be punished at the min-max level. By condition 4.b of Proposition 4.10 such a deviation is not profitable.
(ii) Player i may play an action a i A suppðmÞ when he is not supposed to, or not play it when he is supposed to. If i deviates in this way, and the game is not terminated, his deviation is detected after the revelation phase, and can be punished at the min-max level. As in (i), it is not profitable. (iii) Player i may alter the frequency with which he plays di¤erent actions in suppðx i Þ, or with which he perturbs to a i k in stages that correspond to a joint exit. To deter this kind of deviations, we add standard statistical tests (see, e.g., Solan (1999) or Vieille (2000b) ). (iv) A signaller, say i 1 , can signal an incorrect signal at some round. Since he does not know v t a j for a j 0 Y t , if he sends an incorrect verification key, this key does not correspond to the key the other players possess, and his deviation can be identified. If he sends an incorrect encryption key, trying to frame an innocent player, the report of the other signaller coincides with the realized play. Thus this deviation is detectable as well.
x is weak
In this section we assume that x is weak; that is, x admits one signaller i 0 and at least one weak signaller i 1 . Since x is weak, EðxÞ contains only unilateral exits.
We will see that the identity of the designated quitter can be revealed to everyone. The construction is similar to the construction presented in section 7. The signaller i 0 can reveal the identity of the designated quitter to everyone. However, i 0 will be ignorant of the identity of the designated quitter. We then append a phase in which the weak signaller reveals the identity of the designated quitter to i 0 . Afterwards, the designated quitter is punished by his min-max value. Here we will explain how the weak signaller i 1 , with the help of the signaller, reveals the identity of the designated quitter to the signaller.
Fix e > 0. Let a i 0 A A i 0 and a i 1 B suppðx i 1 Þ be two actions that satisfy
The device chooses jI j di¤erent numbers t 1 < t 2 < Á Á Á < t jI j in the range f1; . . . ; Tg with the uniform distribution,8 where T is su‰ciently large so that Pðt jI j < T À 1=eÞ > 1 À e. To each member of fi 0 ; i 1 g who is not the designated quitter, the device sends these numbers. Next, the revelation phase is modified. After player i 0 sends the verification key and the encryption key, player i 0 either reveals that he is the designated quitter, or reveals the identity of the designated quitter i to every player j 0 i 0 . Player i 1 now has to reveal the identity of the designated quitter to i 0 , assuming i 0 is not the deviator.
For simplicity, number the following T stages by f1; 2; . . . ; Tg. In those stages the players play as follows.
. Each player j 0 i 0 ; i 1 plays x j .
. If i 0 is not the designated quitter, he plays a i 0 at every stage t k , k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; jI j. At all other stages he plays x i 0 .
. If i 1 is not the designated quitter, he knows t 1 ; . . . ; t jI j and therefore reveals the identity of the designated quitter to i 0 . If, on the other hand, i 1 is the designated quitter, he does not know t 1 ; . . . ; t jI j . If he ever plays the action a i 1 , with high probability it will be in a stage di¤erent than t 1 ; . . . ; t jI j , and his identity as the designated quitter be revealed. If he never plays the action a i 1 , he is declared the deviator.
It is easy to verify that no player can profit too much by any type of deviation.
Proof of Proposition 4.10
The goal of this section is to prove Proposition 4.10. Our approach is similar in spirit to that of Solan (1999) . We first introduce an auxiliary game that is 'close' in some sense to the original absorbing game. By studying the asymptotic behavior of a sequence of discounted equilibria of the auxiliary game, we establish the existence of a mixed action x and a probability distribution over EðxÞ that satisfy one of the su‰cient conditions listed in Proposition 4.10.
Definition of an auxiliary game
In Solan (1999) an auxiliary game is defined by changing the non-absorbing payo¤ of the original game. For every discount factor l A ð0; 1Þ the auxiliary game is shown to admit a stationary l-discounted equilibrium x l . Moreover, the limit of the l-discounted min-max values of the auxiliary game is equal to the min-max value of the original game. It is then proved that if there is no uniform e-equilibrium where the players play the limit stationary strategy x 0 ¼ lim l!0 x l and statistically check for deviations of their opponents, then there exists a probability distribution m over the exits Eðx 0 Þ such that x 0 is individually rational for uðmÞ. We cannot apply this result directly to our case since we require the m to satisfy an additional punishability condition. Nevertheless it is still possible to execute something similar.
For every discount factor l A ð0; 1Þ we define an auxiliary discounted game G l ðr rÞ. The payo¤ to player i in G l ðr rÞ associated with a strategy profile s is:
ð1 À lÞ nÀ1 ð1 nayr r i ðx n Þ þ 1 n>y u i ðx y ÞÞ ! wherer r i is given by Lemma 4.9, x n is the mixed-action prescribed by s at stage n, and y is the stage of absorption. That is, the absorbing game with non-absorbing payo¤r r, but at stage n if the game is not yet absorbed, instead of getting the payo¤ rða n Þ the players get the payo¤r rðx n Þ. 
Since the denominator is strictly positive,g g i l is continuous. We now show that for every player i A I and every fixed x Ài A X Ài , the functiong g i l ðx
Ài ; x i Þ : X i ! ½0; 1 is quasi-concave; that is, for every c A R, the set fx i A X i jg g By Lemma 9.1 for every discount factor l the game G l ðr rÞ admits a stationary equilibrium x l .g g l ðx l Þ is the corresponding discounted equilibrium payo¤. By taking a subsequence, we assume w.l.o.g. that the limits x 0 ¼ lim l!0 x l andg g 0 ¼ lim l!0g g l ðx l Þ exist, and that for every i A I , the support, suppðx i l Þ, is independent of l. In the sequel we will assume using the same reasoning that other limits we take exist.
Recall that for every discount factor l A ð0; 1Þ and every profile x g g l ðxÞ ¼ a l ðxÞr rðxÞ þ ð1 À a l ðxÞÞuðxÞ;
where a l ðxÞ ¼ l=ðl þ ð1 À lÞwðxÞÞ. We define a 0 ¼ lim l!0 a l ðx l Þ.
Note that if y is an absorbing profile and ðy l Þ are stationary profiles such that y l ! y then lim l!0 a l ð y l Þ ¼ 0 and lim l!0g g l ðy l Þ ¼ uðyÞ.
For every exit a L A Eðx 0 Þ define
This is the per-stage probability that the game is absorbed through a L if the players play x l . x l induces a probability distribution over Eðx 0 Þ as follows:
This is the conditional probability that the game is absorbed by the exit a L when the players follow x l , given that an exit in Eðx 0 Þ is used.
We define for every a
Then m 0 is a probability distribution over Eðx 0 Þ. 
We first prove that if player i has some action a i that is absorbing against x Proof: Since wðx Proof: We prove the result when x 0 is isolated. The proof when x 0 is semiisolated with signaller not i is similar. By the definition ofr r i ,r r i ðx 0 Þ ¼ p i ðx 0 Þ. If a 0 ¼ 1, the result follows by (8) .
Assume now that x 0 is a semi-isolated profile with signaller i 0 . We show that condition 3 of Proposition 4.10 holds, with suppðmÞ ¼ b j ðaÞ, for any j 0 i 0 . By Lemma 9.2 and the definition ofr r i ðx 0 Þ, g i ðx 0 Þ ag g
